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Bailment and Veterinary Malpractice:
Doctrinal Exclusivity, or Not?
KATIE J.L. Scorr*
INTRODUCTION
This Note highlights an inconsistency in how the law is applied to
animals. Animals are considered the personal property of their owners,'
and as such, when they are delivered by their owner to a veterinarian, the
facts of the situation perfectly satisfy the elements of a bailment relation-
ship. Nonetheless, when courts determine negligence by a veterinarian,
animals' classification as property is disregarded and bailment principles
are not applied. Instead, courts use veterinary malpractice standards.' In
doing so, courts treat veterinary malpractice and bailment as mutually
exclusive doctrines.
Animals' classification as property is usually detrimental to their in-
terests, resulting in low damage awards and difficulty obtaining judicial
relief. However, in determining liability for negligence by a veterinarian,
it would be beneficial to animals to be treated as property because the
application of bailment principles would make it easier for their owners
to recover damages.
Even when courts choose to apply veterinary malpractice rather
than bailment, the property classification is still used for determination
of damages. Thus, even though the classification is disregarded for the
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004; B.S., Chemical
Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, 2ooo. The topic of this Note was inspired by
discussion in the Animal Law course taught by Bruce Wagman at Hastings during fall 2oo2. The
Author would like to thank Adjunct Professor Wagman for reading an early draft of this Note, and
Professor H.G. Prince for his comments on a later draft. Special thanks to Paul Scott and Linda and
Russell Lewis for their enduring support and encouragement.
i. While the Author recognizes the present movement by some communities to change the title
of "owners" to "guardians," the present state of the law makes clear that animals are in fact owned by
their owners. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
2. "Veterinary malpractice" is a term used to describe negligence by a veterinarian when profes-
sional negligence standards are applied. "Veterinary negligence" is synonymous with "negligence by a
veterinarian," and could be used to refer to when either ordinary or professional negligence standards




determination of liability when it would be beneficial to animals and
their owners, it is applied for determination of damages when it is detri-
mental to their interests. This Note will explore the reasons for this in-
consistency.
This Note argues that treating bailment and veterinary malpractice
as mutually exclusive is neither necessary nor desirable. The reason most
often given for applying malpractice standards rather than bailment-
that veterinarians are "professionals" and deserve a "professional stan-
dard of care"'-should not pose a barrier to applying the doctrine of
bailment to this type of case. A professional standard of care is, in fact,
entirely consistent with principles of the bailment doctrine.
The troubling aspect of this situation is that currently, even if bail-
ment principles were applied, thereby making it somewhat easier for
plaintiffs to recover, the potential damages awarded would rarely cover
the litigation costs. 4 However, states are beginning to expand the range of
damages for which a pet owner can recover,5 and as they do, the theory
of liability under which a pet owner can recover will become increasingly
important.
This Note will first give an overview of animals' status as property,
the doctrine of bailment, and veterinary malpractice. Second, the seminal
case discrediting bailment in favor of veterinary malpractice, Price v.
Brown,6 will be discussed. Finally, this Note will explore the reasons why
bailment and veterinary malpractice should not be treated as mutually
exclusive, and why pet owners should be able to recover for negligence
by a veterinarian under the doctrine of bailment.
I. DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW
A. THE STATUS OF ANIMALS
Throughout the United States, animals are primarily treated as per-
sonal property in the eyes of the law.' The classification of animals as
personal property may date as far back as 21oo B.C.8 Under English
common law, this classification was thought to originate in Genesis.9 This
3. See infra Part IIA-B.
4. See infra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 57, 151-52 and accompanying text.
6. 68o A.2d 1149 (Pa. 1996).
7. SONIA S. WAISMAN ET AL., ANIMAL LAW 91 (2d ed. 2002).
8. Steven M. Wise, The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
471, 477-79 (1996).
9. Id. at 526 n.359. Wise quotes William Blackstone, quoting Genesis 1:28:
[In] the beginning of the world, we are informed by holy writ, the all-bountiful creator gave
to man "dominion over all the earth, and over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the
air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." This is the only true and solid
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classification became a part of American common law, as English com-
mon law was thought to be imported into American law unless the spe-
cific law was "altered or rejected" by American law-makers."i
"Hominum causa omne jus constititum. The law is made for men and
allows no fellowship or bonds of obligation between them and the lower
animals."" The long history of classifying animals as property of their
human "owners" is important because this classification underlies many
of the problems faced by animal rights advocates, pet owners, and other
humans who seek to protect the interests of nonhumans'" These prob-
lems fall into two broad categories: (I) limitations on access to the judi-
cial forum by or on behalf of animals and (2) a limited availability of
damages for injuries to animals or animals' owners.
i. Access to a Judicial Forum
The lack of access to a judicial forum stems from the rule that ani-
mals do not have legal status to sue for their own grievances. In state
court, animals are not granted standing because tie-y are the property of
their owners. 3 In federal court, standing is either granted to "persons"
only, 4 thereby excluding animals, 5 or capacity to sue is based on state
law,' 6 where as just noted, animals are not granted standing because they
foundation of man's dominion over external things, whatever airy metaphysical notions may
have been started by fanciful writers on the subject.
Id. (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2-*3 (quoting Genesis 1:28)).
so. Id. at 53o n.383 ("Kent '[took] it for granted, that the common law of England, applicable to
our situation and governments, is the law of this country, in all cases in which it has not been altered or
rejected by statute, or varied by local usages, under the sanction of judicial decisions."') (quoting
JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *28 (1896)).
I I. Id. at 473 n.12 (quoting P.J. FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 300 (12th ed. 1966)).
12. See infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assocs. Animal Hosp., 785 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that "a dog cannot recover for emotional distress-or indeed for any other direct
claims of which we are aware"); Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex. App. 5994) (noting
that dogs are property); see also Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New Eng-
land Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45,49-50 (D. Mass. 1993) ("While neither Massachusetts nor Hawaii law
addresses the precise question of animal standing, cases in each state indicate that animals are treated
as the property of their owners, rather than entities with their own legal rights.").
14. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000); Citizens to End Animal Suffering, 836 F. Supp. at 49 (noting
that the Marine Mammal Protection Act "authorizes suits brought by persons, not animals"); Hawai-
ian Crow v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549,551-52 (D. Haw 199i) (holding that a bird does not have standing
under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") because a bird is not a "person" within the meaning of
the statute).
15. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV.
1333, 1335 (2000) (noting that Congress has restricted standing to "persons").
16. Citizens to End Animal Suffering, 836 F. Supp. at 49 (noting that under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 17(b), the capacity to sue "shall be determined by the law of the individual's domicile" and
that the "provision generally addresses the capacity of corporations, partnerships, and other business
entities to litigate, there is no indication that it does not apply to other non-human entities or forms of
life").
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are the property of their owners. Therefore, an animal cannot sue his
veterinarian for negligent medical treatment," cannot sue developers for
harming his habitat,' and cannot sue for pain and suffering resulting
from cruel treatment. 9 Occasionally, an animal will be listed as a plaintiff
when the designation is not challenged by the defendant." It is also pos-
sible that a statute could confer standing to an animal, and give it access




It should also be noted that individuals and organizations seeking to
increase protections for animals also have trouble gaining standing in
court. 23 Thus, animals do not have personal access to a judicial forum,
and it is also difficult for humans to use the judicial forum to protect
animals' interests. This problem does not normally arise in veterinary
malpractice or bailment cases because the animal has a human owner.
Any injury to the animal is considered property damage suffered by the
owner, and is sufficient for the owner to meet standing requirements.
2. Damages for Injuries to Animals
Damages for injuries related to animals are severely limited. This re-
sults in two problems: (I) there is little to no financial incentive to sue for
injuries to most companion animals; and (2) the types of damages avail-
able are often not adequate to address the injury to the animal or its
owner.
a. Financial Incentives to Sue for Injuries to Animals
There is little financial incentive to sue for injuries to companion
animals because many courts limit damages to "the amount which will
17. See Oberschlake, 785 N.E.2d at 814 (holding that "a dog cannot recover for emotional dis-
tress-or indeed for any other direct claims of which we are aware").
i8. Cf. Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 126 F.3d 461, 466 n.2 (3d Cir.
1997) (refusing to address whether turtles and snakes have standing under the ESA because human
co-plaintiffs clearly did have standing but noting that "the standing to sue of the animals protected un-
der the ESA is far from clear").
59. See Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 15i, 1559 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
2o. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Yeutter, 930 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 199i); Palla v. Hawaii Dept.
of Land and Natural Res., 852 F.2d s io6 (9th Cir. 1988); Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp.
621 (W.D. Wash. i99i); Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
2i. Citizens to End Animal Suffering, 836 F. Supp. at 49. The case states:
[A]s with regard to the ESA in 'Alala, the MMPA expressly authorizes suits brought by
persons, not animals. This court will not impute to Congress or the President the intention
to provide standing to a marine mammal without a clear statement in the statute. If Con-
gress and the President intended to take the extraordinary step of authorizing animals as
well as people and legal entities to sue, they could, and should, have said so plainly.
Id.
22. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1335.
23. For a complete discussion of the difficulties that humans and human organizations face when
seeking to protect the interests of animals in federal court, see id. at 1342-52.
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compensate the owner for the loss and thus return the owner, monetar-
ily, to the status he or she was in before the lOSS.''24 This will usually
amount to the fair market value of the animal.25
However, the owner of a pet "wrongfully killed is not circumscribed
in his proof to its market value, for, if it has no market value, he may
prove its special value to him by showing its qualities, characteristics and
pedigree, and may offer the opinions of witnesses who are familiar with
such qualities. ',, 6 Interestingly, this rule leaves open the possibility for
two different ways to measure damages: market value and special value.
Nevertheless, as the rule is applied, neither method of measuring dam-
ages is likely to give a significant financial incentive to pet owners to sue
for injuries to their pets.
For example, in Green v. Leckington, the Oregon Supreme Court
reviewed a trial court judgment that awarded the plaintiff $700 for the
death of his pedigreed puppy that he bought two months before its death
for $200.27 One of the plaintiff's witnesses testified that the reasonable
market value of the dog at the time of its death was $250, but the plaintiff
testified that the dog had no market value, and thus, he should be able to
prove the dog's special value to him, which he said was $i0o0. The Su-
preme Court of Oregon held that since the dog had a market value, the
plaintiff was not entitled to prove the dog's special value and was limited
to the reasonable market value.
The plaintiff's approach in Green is interesting because it clearly
demonstrates the pet-owner's view, that the pet's special value is greater
than its market value even when it does have a significant market value.
However, the pet owner's valuation of the "special value" is almost cer-
tainly tied closely to what courts call "sentimental value," for which
courts usually refuse to award damages for personal property.3" The types
of characteristics that courts have used to determine "special value" in-
clude: specialized training given to the animal;3' rarity of breed;32 and
24. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Animals § 162 (2002).
25. William C. Root, "Man's Best Friend": Property or Family Member? An Examination of the
Legal Classification of Companion Animals and Its Impact on Damages Recoverable for Their Wrong-
ful Death or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REV. 423, 426-27 (2002).
26. See McCallister v. Sappingfield, 144 P. 432, 433-34 (Or. 1914).
27. Green v. Leckington, 236 P.2d 335,337 (Or. 1951).
28. Id.
29. Id. (emphasizing that only "if it has no market value" shall proof of special value be allowed).
30. See, e.g., McCallister, 144 P. at 433-34.
31. See, e.g., McDonald v. Ohio State Veterinary Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 750,752 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1994).
32. Wilcox v. Butt's Drug Stores, 35 P.2d 978,979 (N.M. 1934).
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breeding potential33 among others. This approach leads to the result that
many mixed-breed domestic pets-which often have a negligible market
value-also have no "special value" unless they have some special char-
acteristic that sets them apart from similar animals.
Furthermore, many owners keep their animals solely for companion-
ship and enjoyment, making it even more difficult for pet owners to
prove any specific facts that would give their animals "special value." In
Ramey v. Collins, after plaintiffs were not satisfied with the treatment of
their dog by the defendant veterinarian, they took the dog to another
veterinarian. The second veterinarian successfully treated the dog, and
at the time of the lawsuit, the dog was still alive. 6 The court held that the
pet's owners could not recover damages for the negligence because the
dog's value as a pet had not changed as a result of the negligent treat-
ment.37 The plaintiffs were allowed to state a claim to recover only the
costs paid to the first veterinarian for the negligent treatment.38
In Ramey, the court applied a rule similar to that in Green, allowing
factors other than market value to be considered when calculating dam-
ages to personal property that does not have an ascertainable market
value. But, the Ramey court implicitly made the distinction between hav-
ing no ascertainable market value and having a negligible market value.39
Only when the market value is not ascertainable, rather than merely neg-
ligible, should the a finding of special value be allowed. The court noted
that "[f]or most people, dog ownership is a liability rather than an asset
to be valued."'4
33. See, e.g., Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368,370-71 (Tex. App. 1994).
34. The Executive Board of the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) adopted the
following statement, titled "Establishing Compensatory Values for Animals Beyond Their Property
Value":
The American Veterinary Medical Association recognizes and supports the legal concept of
animals as property. However, the AVMA also recognizes that some animals have value to
their owners than may exceed the animal's market value. In determining the real monetary
value of the animal, the AVMA believes the purchase price, age and health of the animal,
breeding status, pedigree, special training, and any particular utility the animal has to the
owner should be considered.
Several Factors at Play When Determining Compensatory Value of Animals, AVMA Says, JAVMA
ONLINE NEWS, July I, 2003, at http://www.avma.org/onlnews/avma/julo3/o3o7oj.asp. One should note
that the above position remains a market-based approach, looking at the particular utility of the ani-
mal, not at the sentimental value to the owner.
35. Ramey v. Collins, No. 99CA2665, 2000 WL 776932, at *I (Ohio Ct. App. June 5, 2000) (un-
published decision).




40. ld. But see R. Scott Nolen, California Dog Owner Awarded $39,ooo in Veterinary Malpractice
Suit, JAVMA ONLINE NEWS, Apr. 15, 2004, at http://www.avma.org/onlnews/javma/apro4/o4o4'5e.asp
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These examples demonstrate the difficulty in recovering damages
for injury to a domestic pet. Even if the pet owner can recover the costs
of the negligent treatment, the monetary cost of hiring an attorney and
going to court, as well as the emotional costs of dwelling on the mis-
treatment of the pet during the course of litigation, may render it an un-
wise choice to file suit against a negligent veterinarian.
b. Adequacy of Damages of Injuries to Pets
Pets' classification as property also leads to the problem that the
types of damages available do not adequately address the injuries suf-
fered by pets and their owners. In most jurisdictions, pet owners cannot
recover for their emotional distress from the injury or death of their pet.
Regardless of sentimental attachment, damages for emotional distress
are not allowed for the destruction or injury to personal property.' Fur-
thermore, a pet owner cannot recover for the mental and emotional dis-
tress that the pet may have suffered as a result of the negligent action.4"
This rule leads to an especially unfortunate outcome when the injury is a
permanent one that causes continual emotional distress to the pet's
owner and the pet itself.
For example, in Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, plaintiffs boarded their
dog at the defendant's kennel.43 While the dog was at the kennel, the
kennel owner's dog ripped off one of the front legs and shoulder blade of
the plaintiffs' dog.' The trial court limited damages to the medical ex-
penses involved in treating the dog and refused to award damages for the
emotional distress of the owners or for the aesthetic injury to the dog. 5
One witness testified that the market value of that type of dog was be-
tween "$ioo or $200 regardless of whether it has three or four legs." 6
The court indicated that there "is no indication [the dog's] value as a
(reporting that jury awarded $30,000 for the special value and $9o00 for "unreasonable" payment to
the negligent veterinarians even though estimated fair market value of dog was only $io).
41. See, e.g., Roman v. Carroll, 621 P.2d 307, 308 (Ariz. Ct. App. I98O); Nichols v. Sukaro Ken-
nels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Iowa 1996); Fackler v. Genetzky, 595 N.W.ad 884, 891 (Neb. 1999); Julian
v. De Vincent, 184 S.E.2d 535, 536 (W. Va. 1971). But see La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 SO.
2d 267, 268-69 (Fla. 1964) (affirming allowance of damages for mental distress resulting from mali-
cious act by garbage man of throwing garbage can at plaintiff's dog and thereby killing it); Knowles
Animal Hosp., Inc. v. Wills, 360 So. 2d 37,38-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (allowing damages for men-
tal pain and suffering of pet owner resulting from grossly negligent treatment of their dog); Campbell
v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d io66, 1071 (Haw. i981).
42. Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assocs. Animal Hosp., 785 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003)
(recognizing that dogs do suffer mental distress yet nevertheless holding that a dog cannot state a
claim for mental distress or any other direct claim).
43. Nichols,555 N.W.2d at 691.
44. Id. at 69o.
45. Id. at 69o-9 I .
46. Id. at 69o.
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family pet has even been diminished"47 and that the dog did not have any
"special value.""4 Thus, the plaintiffs were left with a three-legged dog
and only payment of the veterinary bills as redress.49
Many pet owners consider their pets as members of their family, or
even as their own children." It is to be expected that pet owners will be
very upset when their pets are injured or killed.5 It has even been shown
that "grief responses following the death of a pet were comparable to the
grief reactions following the loss of a spouse, parent or child."52 Yet,
when a pet is injured by another person's negligence, pet owners cannot
recover any damages for their emotional distress in most jurisdictions. 3
Very few cases have awarded damages for emotional distress caused
by the injury or death of an animal. 4 It is more likely that a court will
award emotional distress damages for intentional, rather than negligent
acts.5 Courts tend to struggle with the reality that when a pet is injured
or killed, there is an emotional injury rather than an economic, or prop-
erty-type, loss. 56 Yet, courts feel bound by precedent which explicitly
classifies animals as personal property that cannot be the subject of dam-
ages for emotional distress. 7 Courts are hesitant to "open the floodgates"
47. Id. at 692.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Desanctis v. Pritchard, 803 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (divorcing couple
thought of their dog as a child and sought shared custody of the dog after divorce, but Pennsylvania
state law prohibited shared custody of personal property); Root, supra note 25, at 437.
5t. Id. at 439-40.
52. Id. at 44o (quoting John Archer, Why Do People Love Their Pets?, 18 EVOLUTION HUM. BE-
HAY. 237, 240 (1997)).
53. 32 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 351 Veterinary Malpractice nn.67-70 (2002).
54. See La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So. 2d 267, 268-69 (Fla. 1964) (allowing emo-
tional distress to be considered in awarding compensatory and punitive damages for malicious killing
of pet dog); Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d io66, 1071 (Haw. i98i) (allowing re-
covery of emotional distress resulting from negligently caused death of plaintiff's dog even though
dogs are personal property); Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp. Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1979) (allowing recovery for emotional distress caused by wrongfully disposing of plaintiff's dog when
the plaintiff had planned a ceremony memorializing the dog).
55. See La Porte, 163 So. 2d at 268 (allowing emotional distress to be considered in awarding
compensatory and punitive damages for malicious killing of pet dog).
56. Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Iowa 1996). ("[A]lthough we are mindful of
the suffering an owner endures upon the death or injury of a beloved pet, we resolve to follow the ma-
jority of jurisdictions that do not allow recovery of damages for such mental distress.").
57. Id. However, juries may not feel as bound to precedent as judges do. On February 20, 2004 an
Orange County, California, jury awarded a pet owner $3o,ooo for the "special value" of his three-year-
old dog even though the estimated market value of the mixed-breed dog was $Io. Nolen, supra note 40
While this award was for special value, not emotional distress, the award was surely premised on "sen-
timental value" and not a market-based valuation.
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of litigation,5 and possibly extend emotional distress damages to other
types of personal property that people may have a sentimental attach-
ment to, such as heirlooms.59
B. BAILMENT
A bailment is a legal relationship "created by the delivery of per-
sonal property by one person to another in trust for a specific purpose,
pursuant to an express or implied contract to fulfill that trust.",. The per-
son delivering the property is the bailor.6' The person receiving the prop-
erty is the bailee. A bailment can only exist for personal property; it
cannot exist for real property. 63 Early cases make it clear that a bailment.
can be for any tangible, movable personal property.6' Modern courts
have even extended bailment principles to include intangible personalproperty. 65
For many years, bailments have been divided into categories, based
on the purpose of the bailment.6 American law has traditionally divided
bailments into three categories: bailments for the benefit of the bailor,
bailments for the benefit of the bailee, and bailments that are mutually
beneficial to the bailor and the bailee.6 Bailments that are for the sole
benefit of the bailor or the bailee are called gratuitous bailments because
one party receives a benefit from the bailment relationship as a gratuity
of the other party.8 Alternatively, bailments where the relationship is
mutually beneficial to the bailor and bailee are sometimes called lucra-
tive bailments or bailments for hire.6 Mutually beneficial bailments in-
clude the performance of a service upon the delivered property70 in
58. See, e.g., Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assocs. Animal Hosp., 785 N.E.2d 8ix, 815 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003).
59. Corso, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
6o. 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § I (1997).
61. ARMISTEAD M. DOBIE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS § I, at 2 (1914).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 9, at 20.
64. See Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 52 N.E. 898, 9oo (11. 1899).
65. Liddle v. Salem Sch. Dist. No. 6oo, 619 N.E.2d 530, 533, (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (bailment of in-
formation contained in letter from college to high school student regarding recruitment by the col-
lege).
66. EDWIN C. GODDARD, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS § 12, at 5 (1904)
(bailments were first divided into categories in Roman Law and those divisions heavily influenced
English legal writers).
67. 8A AM. JUR. 20 Bailments § 7 (1997). Justice Story was first to divide bailments into these
three categories in his treatise, Commentaries on Bailments. See GODDARD, supra note 66, § 12, at 5
(citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON BAILMENTS (1832)).
68. 8A AM. JUR. 20 Bailments § 7.
69. Id.
70. This sub-category of mutually beneficial bailments is also called "hired services about a thing"
or "locatio operis faciendi." See DoBIE, supra note 61, § 58, at 129.
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exchange for consideration, and the payment of consideration in ex-
change for use of the delivered property.7 The situation in which a vet-
erinarian would be part of a bailment relationship falls into the category
of mutually beneficial bailments: the animal owner, the bailor, delivers
the animal to the veterinarian, the bailee, for veterinary service to be
performed upon the animal, in exchange for payment for the service ren-
dered.
When a bailment is for hire, and the bailee is hired to provide ser-
vices upon a piece of property, the bailee has a legal duty to provide
those services. If the bailee must only care for the bailed property, such
-as boarding an animal in a kennel, the bailee is under a duty to use ordi-
nary diligence in providing that care and would be liable for ordinary ne-
glect." The standard of ordinary diligence, also called "reasonable care,"
is best described as the same level of care that a person would provide to
their own property under similar circumstances.73 Thus, in the example of
boarding a dog at the kennel, reasonable care would include feeding and
watering the animal, providing it with exercise, and medical attention if
needed. The bailee would be liable if he neglected to provide these facets
of ordinary care.
However, if the bailee purports to have specialized skill or knowl-
edge in the service he is hired to provide, he is bound to exercise that
skill or knowledge, and will be held liable if he fails to do so. 4 Further-
more, when a bailee is hired for his specialized skill, the bailor is com-
pensating the bailee for "both his labor and his judgment. [The bailee]
ought not to undertake the work, if he cannot succeed; and he should
know whether he can or not."7 An example of this is described in Com-
mentaries on the Law of Bailments, by Joseph Story: "[I]f a farrier 6 un-
dertakes the cure of a diseased or lame horse, he is bound to apply a
reasonable exercise of skill to the cure; and if through his ignorance or
71. Id.
72. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE CIVIL
AND THE FOREIGN LAW § 23, at 27 (James Schouler rev. corrected enlarged, Little, Brown, and Com-
pany, 9 th ed. 1878) (1836).
73. GODDARD, supra note 66, § 16, at 9.
74. STORY, supra note 72, § 431, at 392.
75. Id. at 393.
76. The present meaning of the word "farrier" is a person who shoes horses. AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000). However, from the mid-18oos to the late i8oos
the definition of a "farrier" changed from someone who undertook much of the medical care of horses
to someone who solely shod horses. Tom Ryan, The Farrier and Hoofcare Resource Center, A Short
History of the Term "Farrier," at http://www.horseshoes.com/advice/ryani/thsofttr.htm (last visited
Feb. 26, 2004). See also Conner v. Winton, 8 Ind. 315, 317-20. (Ind. 1856). Thus, in Story's example he
was likely referring to a farrier as a someone who undertook at least some of the medical care of
horses, not merely tending to their shoes. See Ryan, supra.
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bad management the horse dies, he will be liable for the loss."" In mod-
ern language: when a person takes their animal to a veterinarian to de-
termine the cause of an illness and the veterinarian decides that the best
treatment is surgery, the person should expect the veterinarian to use his
specialized skill and judgment in making the decision that surgery is the
best treatment. In addition, the person should be able to expect that the
veterinarian would not undertake that course of treatment if he did not
expect it to be successful. However, it is important to note that these are
often implied contractual terms that can be modified by an express un-
derstanding between the parties. Thus, if the veterinarian is unsure of his
possible success, the terms of the contract on which the bailment is
founded can be modified to exclude the implied promise of successful
treatment.
A bailor can sue the bailee for a breach of the bailment if the prop-
erty was damaged or not returned.78 The bailor must first make a prima
facie showing that the terms of the bailment were not met.79 To make this
showing, the bailor must establish that the property was delivered to the
bailee, he demanded the return of the property, and it was either not re-
turned or was returned in a damaged condition. 8° If the bailee had sole,
actual, and physical possession of the bailed property, there is a pre-
sumption that the bailee was negligent, meaning that the court will as-
sume that the bailee did not meet the requisite standard of care."
The presumption of negligence is rebuttable, or vanishing. If the
bailee produces a reason for the breach of the bailment, other than his
failure to use a reasonable standard of care, the presumption that the
bailee was negligent will be overcome and the burden of production will
82shift back to the bailor to prove the elements of negligence. In some ju-
risdictions the presumption is only rebuttable if the bailee proves the ac-
tual cause of the injury or loss of the property. 3 It is important to note
that the burden of proof of all facts relevant to the cause of action re-
mains with the bailor at all times; the presumption merely shifts the bur-
den of production to the bailee after the bailor makes a prima facie
77. STORY, supra note 72, § 431, at 393.
78. 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 240 (997).
79- Id. § 244.
8o. See, e.g., Inter-Ocean (Free Zone), Inc. v. Manaure Lines, Inc. "Manana V," 615 F. Supp. 710,
716 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Price v. Brown, 68o A.2d 1149, 1152 (Pa. 1996); Sky Aviation Corp. v. Colt, 475
P.2d 301, 304 (Wyo. 197o).
81. 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 233.
82. See, e.g., Leake & Nelson Co. v. W. J. Megin, Inc., iii A.2d 559, 56o-61 (Conn. 1955); Vece v.
Vanacore, 198 A.2d 728, 730-31 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1963); Value Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Collection Chevro-
let, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1376, 1377-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 199o).
83. 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 234.
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showing.84 If the bailee fails to overcome the presumption, the bailor will
be entitled to judgment as a matter of law."5
C. VETERINARY MALPRACTICE AND NEGLIGENCE
Malpractice is a term used loosely when applied to veterinarians.
"Malpractice" is a term used for "negligence" when the negligent con-
duct involves professional services. 6 Under common law, "malpractice"
principles apply only to physicians and attorneys. 7 In some jurisdictions,
veterinarians are considered "professionals" for the purposes of distin-
guishing whether malpractice or negligence principles apply, and in some
they are not.88 The primary differences between malpractice and negli-
gence are evidentiary requirements for proving the standard of care and
varying statutes of limitations.
i. Common Principles
Whether you label negligence by a veterinarian "malpractice" or
not, the same general principles apply. To prove liability, a plaintiff must
prove the standard of care expected of the veterinarian, a duty by the
veterinarian to conform to that standard, a failure by the veterinarian to
meet that standard of care, a resulting injury to the plaintiff or his prop-
erty, and that the veterinarian's failure to meet the standard of care was
the proximate cause of the injury.'s Of these elements, arguably the most
contentious legal issue is the standard of care because it is the standard
against which the veterinarian's conduct will be measured. The strin-
gency of the standard chosen will likely be outcome determinative. If the
standard of care is proven to be very high, then it is more likely that the
veterinarian will not have met such a high standard. If the standard is set
very low, it is more likely that the veterinarian will have met or surpassed
it.
The relevant standard of care should be consistent with a level of
reasonable skill, diligence, and attention that may ordinarily be expected
of careful, skillful, and trustworthy people in the profession.' The stan-
84. Id. § 244.
85. Alamo Airways, Inc. v. Benum, 374 P.2d 684,686 (Nev. 1962); Sky Aviation, 475 P.2d at 304.
86. MERRIAM-WEBSTER's DICTIONARY OF LAW 304 (1996).
87. Cheryl M. Bailey, Annotation, Veterinarian's Liability for Malpractice, 71 A.L.R. 4th 811 § ta,
n.4 (1989).
88. Compare Southall v. Gabel, 277 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) (not including conduct
by veterinarians in the definition of malpractice), with Williamson v. Prida, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 868, 872
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (applying malpractice principles to veterinarians).
89. 78 AM. JUR. 2D Veterinarians § 7 (2002).
90. See Williamson, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 873; Rowland v. Harrison, 577 A.2d 51, 52 (Md. 199o);
Kerbow v. Bell, 259 P.2d 317,319 (Okla. 1953).
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dard of care will usually be determined by the jury.9 ' The burden is on
the plaintiff to "affirmatively prove the relevant standard of care exer-
cised by other veterinarians, as well as the defendant veterinarian's de-
parture from that standard when treating the animal."9
2. Expert Testimony
In non-professional negligence cases, the standard of care is that of a
reasonable person93 and is therefore within the understanding of laymen.
However, to prove the standard of care in a veterinary malpractice case
using professional negligence principles, the plaintiff will almost always
need to present expert testimony so that the jury will be able to decide
what standard of care should be expected of the defendant veterinarian.94
In many jurisdictions, expert testimony is considered a requirement of a
plaintiff's professional negligence case.95 This standard is implicitly objec-
tive; it speaks to the standard that should be exercised by other veteri-
narians, not the actual level of skill that the accused veterinarian
possesses.96 In fact, it can be an error for a jury to consider the accused
veterinarian's actual experience or training when determining the stan-
dard of care.'
In only very rare cases is expert testimony not necessary in a veteri-
nary malpractice case." When the "very nature of the acts complained of
bespeaks improper treatment and malpractice" it may not be necessary
to present expert testimony.' This may occur when the action taken or
omitted by the veterinarian is something that a layperson without veteri-
nary training would understand as falling below the relevant standard of
91. 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 19o (1989). This is true unless the legislature or an appellate
court have established a standard of care applicable to "substantially identical situations." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 cmt. g (1965).
92. Bailey, supra note 87, at 823 § 2b.
93. "Unless the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being
negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 283.
94. 32 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 351 Veterinary Malpractice § 8.
95. See, e.g., Haile v. Sutherland, 598 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999): Casey v. Levine.
621 N.w.2d 482,490 (Neb. 2001).
96. See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 192. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 29 9 A
("Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render
services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge nor-
mally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities."); id.
§ 299A cmt. e ("In the absence of any such special representation [regarding superior skill or knowl-
edge], the standard of skill and knowledge required of the actor who practices a profession or trade is
that which is commonly possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing.").
97. Id.
98. See Mathew v. Klinger, 686 N.Y.S.2d 549,550 (N.Y. App. Term. 1998).
99. Id. (quoting Restrepo v. State, 55o N.Y.S.2d 536,541 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1989)) (internal quotations
omitted).
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care. For example, no expert testimony was needed to prove veterinary
malpractice when a veterinarian did not x-ray a dog's throat, esophagus,
and stomach when there was reason to believe the dog swallowed a for-
eign object."m
3. Statute of Limitations
The second primary difference between "malpractice" and other
negligence claims is that the statute of limitations for malpractice claims
is shorter in many states.'"' Some states specifically include veterinarians
in their statutes regarding limitations on malpractice actions.' 2 For ex-
ample, in Arkansas, veterinarians are included in the definition "medical
care providers," and thus all legislation regarding malpractice by human-
health care providers also applies to veterinarians.' 3 Under Arkansas
law, all malpractice actions against "medical care providers" have a stat-
ute of limitations of two years,0 4 whereas the statute of limitations for
taking or injury to personal property is three years.'05 In other states, vet-
erinarians are not included in malpractice acts, but there is specific legis-
lation that reduces the statute of limitations for cases against them.'°6
II. DOCTRINAL EXCLUSIVITY
A. PRICE V. BROWN
The seminal case in the conflict between veterinary malpractice and
bailment is Price v. Brown."7 In Price, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that breach of bailment does not apply to a veterinarian who has
performed surgery on the plaintiff's animal."' The court analogized vet-
erinary practice to legal and medical practices, which involve "specialized
education, knowledge, and skills."" 9 The court noted that veterinary
medicine is heavily regulated and requires a license." The court also
suggested that there are "significant differences" between veterinary sur-
gical services and grooming or kennel services."' For these reasons, the
too. Id.
loi. See Gregg A. Scoggins, Legislation Without Representation: How Veterinary Malpractice Has
Slipped Through the Cracks of Tort Reform, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 980-82 (1990).
102. See id. at 978-79 (noting that only Arkansas and California specifically include veterinarians
in their malpractice reform legislation).
103. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-114-201(2) (Michie 1987).
104. Id. § I6-I14-203(a).
1O5 . Id. § 16-56-1o5(6).
io6. See Scoggins, supra note ioi, at 979 n.228, and accompanying text.
107. Price v. Brown, 68o A.2d 1149 (Pa. 1996).
so8. Id. at 1151, 1153.
io9. Id. at 1152.
iio. Id.
iii. Id. at 1153.
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court extended professional negligence concepts to veterinary medicine,
and refused to apply the breach of bailment cause of action."2
The court noted that under a breach of bailment claim, the bailee "is
required to exercise ordinary diligence and is responsible only for ordi-
nary neglect.""..3 Under veterinary malpractice, the veterinarian must ex-
ercise the "appropriate standard of care," and the plaintiff "must
specifically allege that the veterinarian was negligent in the performance
of his professional services.""..4 In applying the professional negligence
principles to the claim, the court held that "allegations relating to the
professional services rendered by [the veterinarian] cannot be deliber-
* ately excised from the complaint as if the veterinarian's services were no
different than those offered by a kennel operator or a dog groomer.""..5
The court refused to allow the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing
that the terms of bailment were not met, and then rely on the presump-
tion of negligence that would arise under the bailment doctrine."6
Essentially, the court held that even though the plaintiff satisfied the
traditional elements of a bailment claim, that cause of action was not ap-
plicable when the loss or injury resulted from a professional's negli-
gence."' The court did not question that the elements of a bailment were
satisfied."' Nevertheless, the court seemed compelled to choose between
professional negligence and bailment by treating them as mutually exclu-
sive, and chose to apply professional negligence over bailment."9
B. CRITIQUE OF PRICE V. BROWN
The majority in Price considered only the training and licensing in-
volved with becoming a provider of "professional" services, but not the
professional-patient relationship.'2° This fact seems remarkable consider-
ing that the patient in the veterinary context is an animal and the veteri-
narian actually has no legal duty to the animal since the animal itself has
no legal status.'2' This is a major difference between the animal-
veterinarian relationship and the human patient-doctor relationship, the
context in which malpractice is usually applied. The relationship between
112. Id. at 1152-53.
113. Id. at 1152 n.2.
114. Id. at 1152.
i15. Id. at 1153.
II6. See supra notes 78-85.
II7. Id.
118. Id. See also id. at 1154 (Nix, C.J., dissenting); id. at 1154 (Castille, J., dissenting).
II9. Id. at 1153.
120. See id. at 1150-51.
121. See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
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a medical doctor and a human patient is not grounded in contract.' It
"has its foundation in public considerations which are inseparable from
the nature and exercise of his calling; it is predicated by the law on the
relation which exists between physician and patient, which is the result of
a consensual transaction, and not necessarily one of contract.' 23
The doctor-patient relationship is entirely different than the rela-
tionship between a veterinarian and an animal or between a veterinarian
and an animal's owner. In the veterinarian-animal context, the relation-
ship is not consensual, as it is in the doctor-patient context. The animal
does not, and cannot give consent, nor is the relationship recognized by
law since the animal itself has no legal status."4 Since animals are consid-
ered property, the legal relationship between the animal and the veteri-
narian is no different than that of a mechanic and an automobile, or a
dry-cleaner and a three-piece suit.
In the veterinarian-owner context, the veterinarian is not performing
services upon the owner because the owner is not the patient. The rela-
tionship between a veterinarian and the owner is grounded entirely in
contract, unlike the doctor-patient relationship. The owner is taking his
animal to the veterinarian for services to be rendered upon the animal in
exchange for consideration. Thus, the doctor-patient relationship that
underlies medical malpractice liability is simply not present in the case of
veterinary malpractice liability.
Secondly, the fact that the "patients" are animals, and as such are
considered personal property, was not considered important enough to
warrant discussion."' Similarly, that bailment principles developed over
many years to deal with situations where one party leaves personal prop-
erty with another and that property is not properly returned was not
sufficient to warrant applying bailment doctrine in this case. The fact that
the veterinarian was highly trained and a member of a regulated profes-
sion was treated as a sufficiently important justification to enable the
court to ignore the doctrine that was developed to deal with precisely this
type of case.
Finally, the court gave no justification for why bailment and veteri-
nary malpractice could not be applied. 7 The court treated them as mu-
tually exclusive doctrines even though bailment principles allow for a
varying standard of care depending on the experience and training of the
122. 6i Am. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 186 (2002).
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
125. See generally Price v. Brown, 68o A.2d 1149 (Pa. 1996).
126. DOBIE, supra note 61, § 17, at 38.
127. Price, 680 A.2d at 1154 (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
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bailee, 8 and merely shifts the initial burden of production to the defen-
dant, not the final burden of proof.1 29 The majority also did not consider
how great, or inconsequential, the burden on veterinarians would be if
bailment was applied. In fact, when veterinary malpractice principles are
applied, the defendant will usually present his own definition of what the
standard of care should be and whether he met that standard when pre-
senting his defense.'30 So the only real difference is that, when there is
simply no defense for the veterinarian's actions, he will not be able to
satisfy the initial burden of production and the presumption will allow
the plaintiff to win on summary judgment. If the veterinarian has a le-
gitimate defense, then the difference will be that the veterinarian will
have to present his defense after the plaintiff makes a prima facie show-
ing, rather than after the plaintiff has presented her entire case. In fact,
having the veterinarian present his defense earlier in the proceeding is a
very logical way for a court to go about its fact-finding, considering that
the veterinarian is the only person that knows exactly what treatment, or
lack thereof, was provided to the animal. It is this logic that inspired the
development of bailment principles to begin with-the person caring for
the property is in the best position to explain why it was not properly re-
turned to its owner.'
3'
C. MALPRACTICE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
When malpractice legislation does not explicitly include or exclude
veterinarians, courts are left to decide if they should apply the statute of
limitations applicable to negligence or to malpractice. This is simply a
policy choice left to the courts, and two courts interpreting the statute
can easily decide differently. In Storozuk v. Butler,13 an Ohio Court of
Common Pleas ruled that "malpractice" includes negligence by a veteri-
narian under a statute that reduces the statute of limitations in malprac-
tice actions to one year. However, in Southall v. Gabel, the Court of
Appeals of Ohio interpreted the very same Ohio statute' 3  and ruled that
negligence by a veterinarian was not included in the statute.'34 In Storo-
zuk, the court relied primarily on the similarity between physicians and
veterinarians in that a professional standard of care is applied to both of
them in negligence actions.33 In Southall, however,,the court strictly lim-
128. STORY, supra note 72, § 431, at 392-93.
129. DOBI, supra note 6I, § 17, at 36-38.
130. See Price, 680 A.2d at 1155 (Castille, J., dissenting).
131. DoBIE, supra note 6I, § 17, at 38.
132. Storozuk v. Butler Co., 203 N.E.2d 511 (Ohio Ct. Corn. PI. 1964).
133. See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (West 1994).
134. Southall v. Gabel, 277 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Ohio Ct. App. 197i).
135. Storozuk, 203 N.E.2d at 512-13.
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ited the statute's definition of "malpractice" to the common law defini-
tion which included only members of the medical profession and attor-
neys."6 The court also noted in Southall that the "very essence of
'malpractice' is the patient-physician relationship" which was between
the defendant-veterinarian and a colt, not the defendant-veterinarian
and the plaintiff. '37
Thus, even when professional negligence concepts are applied to
negligence by veterinarians, there remain inconsistencies in the applica-
tion of those concepts. If only the similarities in training and types of ser-
vices provided by veterinarians and physicians are considered, it would
seem that the similar theories of liability should be applied. If similar
theories of liability are applied, then it would also seem that the time
limit for bringing that type of action should be the same. However, if the
patient-physician relationship is considered, then the veterinarians and
physicians seem to have vastly different practices, both legally and prac-
tically. "A human patient cannot leave his or her liver or heart for treat-
ment and make a subsequent demand for its return; it is the patient who
is treated and the patient who has a cause of action against the physician
providing medical treatment;" whereas an animal patient cannot bring a
cause of action against their veterinarian because they lack standing to
do so.3 Furthermore, even if all medical malpractice principles were ap-
plied to veterinarians, the types of damages available remain vastly dif-
ferent. Pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of companionship
are all frequently available either to the human patient or the patient's
family,'39 unlike the animal patient, for whom damages are usually lim-
ited to "fair market value.""'4
III. BACK TO BAILMENT
This Note has explored the conflicts and inconsistencies with apply-
ing malpractice principles rather than bailment principles in lawsuits
against veterinarians by pet owners for negligent treatment of their pets.
These conflicts and inconsistencies demonstrate that the majority in Price
v. Brown'4' made an incorrect decision. The elements of a breach of
bailment action, delivery of personal property to the bailee for a specific
purpose, a demand for that property by the bailor, and a failure by the
bailee to deliver that property or delivery in a damaged condition,'42 fit
136. Southall, 277 N.E.2d at 232.
137. Id.
138. Price v. Brown, 651 A.2d 548,552 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
139. See 6I AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers §§ 340-42 (2002).
140. Root, supra note 25, at 426-27.
141. Price, 680 A.2d at 1154.
142. See id. at I152.
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very neatly with the typical facts surrounding a case involving negligence
by a veterinarian. To hold that veterinary malpractice and bailment are
mutually exclusive is simply not necessary.
In Price v. Brown, the court primarily relied upon similar educa-
tional and licensing requirements, and thus an increased standard of care,
in imputing professional negligence principles to veterinary negligence
cases.'43 However, the standard of care in bailment actions can, and
should, vary with the purpose of the bailment.'" When professionals, or
others with specialized skill, are hired to perform a service as part of a
bailment relationship, they are under a duty to use their education, ex-
perience, and judgment.'45 The fact that veterinarians are more educated
or regulated than other types of service-providers who may be involved
in bailment relationships should not necessitate that they be excused
from the bailment doctrine. Bailment principles developed in response to
the reality that the bailee was in the best situation to explain the loss or
damage to the property.' 46 This reality is unaffected by the education or
level of regulation required of the bailee.
The major difference between veterinary malpractice and bailment
is who has the initial burden of production. In veterinary malpractice the
plaintiff has the burden, whereas in bailment once the plaintiff-bailor has
made a prima facie case the burden shifts to the defendant-bailee to re-
but the presumption of negligence. However, even in bailment, the ulti-
mate burden of proof always remains with the plaintiff-bailor.'
Applying bailment principles will not cause drastic hardship for veteri-
narians. In most cases where malpractice is applied, the veterinarian will
still have to mount a defense to demonstrate he was not negligent. 48 Re-
quiring the veterinarian to present his side of the story first may be a
procedural inconvenience for the veterinarian, but it makes sense con-
sidering that only the veterinarian really knows what happened. Simi-
larly, the presumption of negligence that results from the plaintiff
making out a prima facie showing of the elements of a bailment is not so
great a burden. If the veterinarian satisfies the burden of production and
offers an excuse for the loss of or injury to the animal, then the presump-
tion vanishes and the plaintiff must go forward with her case.'49 It is not
unreasonable to require a veterinarian to explain the cause of the injury
143. See id. at H152-53.
144. STORY, supra note 72, § 431, at 392.
145. Id.
146. DOBIE, supra note 61, § 17, at 38.
147. Id. § 17, at 36-38.
148. See Price, 68o A.2d at 1155(Castille, J., dissenting).
149. See 8A AM. JUR. 20 Bailments § 234 (997).
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to, or loss of, a person's cherished pet. Even if the presumption stands
and the veterinarian is found to be in breach of the bailment, the dam-
ages awarded to the plaintiff-pet-owner could be minimal if the pet's tra-
ditional property classification is applied. For this reason, the legal
system should not be hesitant to give pet owners a forum for demanding
from their veterinarian an explanation of their pet's loss or injury.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs should be allowed to state a claim for breach of bailment
when their veterinarian negligently treats their pet. But, so long as plain-
tiffs are limited to the fair market value of their pets,'5 ° there will be no
incentive to sue and veterinarians will have no financial incentive to
avoid negligent treatment.
Currently, some state legislatures have begun to consider methods
for expanding the types and amounts of damages for injuries to people's
pets. Some of these proposals include allowing claims for damages for
loss of companionship,' emotional distress, and pain and suffering of
animals and/or their owners,'52 even though these are all manifestly con-
tradictory to our classification of animals as property. These proposals
further highlight the legal system's inconsistent approach to issues re-
garding animals. Also, many commentators have discussed declassifying
animals as property,'53 but the idea of giving animals legal status in
American courts is something that many people are not prepared to ac-
cept.'54 While there is currently no foreseeable consensus on the types of
150. Root, supra note 25, at 426-27.
I51. See, e.g., S.B. 932 § 2(b), I83rd Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003) (proposing to allow human
companions to recover damages for "loss of reasonably expected society, companionship, comfort,
protection and services of the deceased animal to his or her human companions" when their animal-
companion is killed by a "willful, wanton, reckless or negligent act"); H.B. 84, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Miss. 2003) (died in committee) (proposing to allow pet "owner" to recover "an amount not to ex-
ceed Five Thousand Dollars ($5,0o0.00) for the owner's loss of companionship and affection of the
pet" for the intentional or negligent killing of their "canine, feline, bird, horse or other domesticated
pet"). But cf. S.B. 159, 2003-2004 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2003). Senate Bill 159 proposed to allow dam-
ages for "loss of reasonably expected society, companionship, love and affection," of up to $io,ooo,
when resulting from the death or injury of a pet that was caused by the intentional or negligent act of
another but provided that "this section [shall not] be construed to authorize any award of none-
conomic damages in an action for professional negligence against a licensed veterinarian." Id. § i(e).
152. S.B. 932 § 2(c), (f), 183rd Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003) S.B. 932 proposes allowing a
guardian ad litem or next friend to recover damages for "pain, suffering and loss of faculties sustained
by the animal" to be put in "a trust for the care of the animal" with "[a]ny remainder of trust funds ex-
isting at the death of the animal... distributed to a non-profit organization dedicated to the protection
of animals." Id. The Bill also proposes to allow recovery of damages for "pain, suffering, emotional
distress and consequential damages sustained by the animal's human companion .... Id.
153. See, e.g., Wise, supra note 8; GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW (1995).
154. Bob Vella, host of Pet Talk America, a nationally syndicated radio show devoted to pets,
noted that the movement to change "owner" to "guardian" will give animal rights groups "the ammu-
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damages that should be allowable, these potential reforms will certainly
make legal recourse more attractive to plaintiff-pet-owners, and as that
occurs, the appropriate theory of recovery will necessarily come into
question. When these issues arise, courts should not treat bailment and
veterinary malpractice as mutually exclusive doctrines, and so long as our
legal system classifies animals as the property of their owners, courts
should apply the doctrine of bailment in cases regarding their injury or
loss.
nition to take away the rights of pet lovers as we know it." Bob Vella, Pet Owner to Pet Guardian: A
Bad Idea!, at http://www.mofed.org/Bob-Velia.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2003).
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